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In most clinical approaches the body receives little attention. In cognitive science, in
contrast, the embodied and grounded perspective, which emphasizes the importance of
the body, has been intensively explored over the last decade. The present article aims to
engage theorists of embodied cognition and clinical experts in a discussion encouraging
them to consider the insights that may arise from each other’s approaches. In a review of
the cognitive and clinical literature substantial overlap is revealed between cognitive and
clinical domains.
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The interpretations academics and professionals offer for psy-
chological disorders are not unanimous. Traditional therapeutic
approaches explain that psychological disorders arise from irra-
tional beliefs and illogical thought patterns or from unresolved
emotional conﬂicts (e.g., Zeig, 1997; Sutker and Adams, 2001).
Within these perspectives, an even wider range of treatments is
offered. Some treatment options are targeted at changing learned
behaviors, others are aimed at reshaping old attachment styles,
others work on memories arising from relations occurring within
the original family system, and others involve medical psychoso-
matic concepts. Few approaches to clinical treatment, however,
are able to provide a comprehensive and integrated theoretical
account of all human expressions (Palmer and Woolfe, 2000).
Alongside such views, the connection between the body (and
bodily states), cognition and emotion is theoretically accepted
(Van Oudenhove and Cuypers, 2010). According to some ther-
apeutic approaches (Totton, 2003), and even in some early works
in psychodynamic theory – later studied in depth by other psycho-
analysts such as Perrin (2010) – the body plays an important causal
role in the development of mental disorders. From a more body-
oriented perspective it is argued that the body is included in all
processes involved in self-awareness (Segal et al., 2002). Röhricht
and colleagues (Röhricht and Priebe, 2006; Röhricht et al., 2013)
provide congruent evidence. For example, the authors speciﬁ-
cally report on the positive effects of the bodily therapy in two
separate groups of schizophrenic and depressed patients. They
showed that the negative, depressive symptoms decreased more
than in controls. The authors also report that bodily techniques
are effective for treatment of mental disorders among patients
who do not respond to traditional talking therapies, e.g., somato-
form disorders/medically unexplained syndromes, post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), anorexia nervosa, and chronic schizophre-
nia (Röhricht and Priebe, 2006; Röhricht, 2009). Also for medical
practice, a number of clinical studies support that bodily thera-
pies have positive impacts in pathological conditions (Moyer et al.,
2004; Tsao, 2007).
One of the approaches that is presently attracting the atten-
tion of researchers and professionals by claiming a full integration
between the bodily and the psychological aspects is the Mindful-
ness approach. Mindfulness is described as“a process of regulating
[clients’] attention in order to bring a quality of non-elaborative
awareness to current experience and a quality of relating to one’s
experience within an orientation of curiosity, experiential open-
ness, and acceptance” (Bishop et al., 2004, p. 234). In recent years,
a number of studies have investigated the both the psychological
and the physical modulations that can be achieved when people
reach certain states of mindful awareness (Grossman et al., 2004;
Michalak et al., 2010). Mindfulness techniques have been used to
enhance self-observation from inner and outer perspectives. The
mindfulness approach represents a third-wave for many clinical
and non-clinical treatments because it prepares people to respond
functionally and consciously to their environment (e.g., Boyle,
2011).
In recent years, the connection between what is expressed and
conveyed by the body and cognitive, functional and emotional
expressions has received renewed interest from a wide range of
neuroscientists. Damasio (2005) approached the mind-body link
directly byproposing that somaticmarkers are intimately related to
thinking and decision-making. In a similar manner, other scholars
have suggested the existence of a gut–brain/brain–gut axes (Mayer,
2011). Gut microbes appear able to transmit information directly
to the central nervous system (CNS), communicating many of
the changes that occur in the gut. Through this communication
pathway, the CNS can identify the presence of pathogens in the gut
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lumen and activate appropriate response mechanisms. It seems
that the level of intestinal microbiota and inﬂammation markers
have a role, as for example, in the depression states (Bested et al.,
2013; Rawdin et al., 2013).
Froma cognitive perspective, the body–mind coupling has been
at the center of scientiﬁc discussion in neuroscience for many
years. In the middle of the last century, Yarbus (1967) described
the importance of the muscular eye movement for vision and
visual attention. Similarly, Liberman et al. (1967) proposed that
language comprehension is inseparable from language produc-
tion. More recently, a group of neurons was discovered in the
monkey premotor cortex (di Pellegrino et al., 1992). The neurons
able to produce electrophysiological spikes that have a similar pat-
tern regardless of whether the monkey is executing an action or
observing the same action but performedby the experimenter (i.e.,
grasping somemonkey food). Thedouble-ﬁring property has led to
this group of neurons to be termed Mirror Neurons (Gallese et al.,
1996). When evidence of a similar system was reported in humans
(Mukamel et al., 2010), the connection between body and mind
entered centrally in the domain of psychology. The mirror neu-
ron network serves as an automatic and involuntary system that is
strengthened by links, such as motor expertise, between the action
observer and the action performer (Castiello et al., 2009). Dys-
functions within this reverberating network are also considered to
be a basis of empathic deﬁcits associated with autistic spectrum
disorder (Williams, 2008). In last years, the human mirror neu-
ron system network has been found to respond to various stimuli,
including action words (D’Ausilio et al., 2009) and pain-related
stimuli. Avenanti et al. (2005) reported higher levels of activation
in the brain area that principally controls hand movements when
participants watched a video clip of a needle piercing a person’s
hand than when participants watched a neutral video in a control
condition. However, in some cases, the mirror neuron network
has been used to explain even the mechanisms of empathic and
emotional resonance that come into play in therapeutic settings
(Berrol, 2006; Gallese et al., 2007; Schermer, 2010), as well as cul-
tural, social, and psychodynamic interactions (Vanderwert et al.,
2012).
With the growing evidence for the inﬂuence of the body in
the control of cognitive processes, a new perspective (e.g., Varela
et al., 1991; Borghi and Pecher, 2012), known as Embodied Cog-
nition (EC) has developed. Recently, theorists have argued that
mind-body inﬂuences are related to bodily states as well as to
the physical and bodily experiences people have (Fischer, 2012).
Along this vein, Barsalou (2008) suggested that the use of the
concept of grounding is preferable to embodiment because the
former includes concepts relating to simulation that are able to
occur even when the action actor and the action observer do not
share the same action motor control. This would be the case if a
patient suffering apraxic were to engage in conversation about a
pen. The patient would be able to name and describe the pen and
provide relevant information about it, such as where it can usually
be found, but would not be able to perform actions with the pen,
such as write with the pen. In this way, aside from the boundaries
of the body, the concept of grounding relies more on the effec-
tiveness with which physical experiences interact with cognitive
processes (e.g., Symes et al., 2008; Eder and Hommel, 2013).
Aside from the growing scientiﬁc and clinical evidence sup-
porting the grounded body–mind interconnection, what appears
missing from both ﬁelds is a proper translational process that
integrates the scientiﬁc and clinical domains. Regarding clinical
psychology, the opinions of academics and professionals differ
greatly: there are cases in which grounding the therapeutic pro-
cess in bodily terms using movements, posture, and physiological
indexes is neglected or it is used only metaphorically (Sensky et al.,
2007). There are examples of professionals who commit to theater,
yoga, and dance the bodily healing aspect. Such a process of devo-
lution is necessary when it is not possible to theoretically integrate
such aspects into the existing theory (Palmer and Woolfe, 2000).
On the other hand, there are health care professionals who are
accustomed to working only with the physicality of the body and
who ﬁnd themselves unprepared for dealing with emotional and
psychological aspects that arise during treatment.
One relatively new clinical approach that integrates bodily and
psychological aspects is the Neo-Functionalism (NF) approach
(Rispoli, 2008; Ottoboni and Iacono, 2013). The NF approach
was developed from the body-centered perspectives. The involve-
ment of the body within the therapeutic setting has generated two
kinds of advantages: it provides the clients with the opportunity
to communicate their psychological states directly without limits
and it provides the therapist with the opportunity to get deeply in
touch with the clients’ emotions and expressions. According to this
view, indeed, the body conveys and communicates the individual’s
psychological states as it receives feedback from outcomes of phys-
ical actions. Body movements and facial expressions, as well as the
contextual information have been indicated as inﬂuencing psycho-
logical states and activities, such as memory, predisposition, and
decision-making (Strack et al., 1988; Hatﬁeld et al., 1992; Craig,
2002; Dijkstra et al., 2007) and pain perception (Avenanti et al.,
2005).
In the process of clinical evaluation and treatment, NF con-
siders all life experiences people have had according to the
experiences’ grounded and embodied aspects. The core concept
of the NF approach relies on a discrete group of life instances
whose experiences affect cognitive functioning and expressions
(Rispoli, 2008; Ottoboni and Iacono, 2013). They are claimed to
be universal and are called Basic Experiences of the Self (BEsS) to
denote the strict connection between two concepts, the Self and
grounded experiences. Indeed, the connection between behaviors
(independently of their sane or deviant forms), the neurological
background (intact or damaged), the social context (read social
experiences) and the development of the Self has recently arisen
a number of interesting debates within the scientiﬁc community
(see, for example, Blanke andMetzinger, 2009; Brugger et al., 2013;
Reed and McIntosh, 2013).
The way individuals experience each Basic Experience of the
Self (BES) produces cognitive, emotional, physiological, and
postural-related outcomes. Each time the same BES is experi-
enced the individual stores a memory of the outcomes of the
experience, matches them with past experiences and uses them
to create expectations for the future (see Logan, 2002; see also
Mancia, 2006 for a psychodynamic perspective). If the BES is
experienced positively, memories are formed and are made avail-
able later for dealing with novel situations. In contrast, if the
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response to the BES is maladaptive, it may generate a sense of
inability to deal with novel situations (Rispoli, 2008; Ottoboni
and Iacono, 2013). Each BES may be experienced several times
during the lifespan. The averaged mode in which each BES is
experienced determines the manner in which memories of the
BES are stored. The account that only the repeated outcomes of
the same BES can modulate the behavior highlights that such a
grounding process of memory development is not a point-to-point
process; it required time either to form the maladaptive responses
or to develop positive responses. Hence, if a large number of BEsS
are experienced negatively, the individual’s responses to environ-
mental demands will be poor because of a low level of resilience
(Rothschild, 2000); indeed, the higher the functioning, the more
adaptive the responses.
The NF interpretation of the word functioning is the same that
grounding theory provides: each bodily expression (i.e., function)
comprehends cognitive, emotional, postural, and physiological
features (see also Hatﬁeld et al., 1992). In line with this view,
a depressed demeanor expresses a number of cognitive, physi-
ological, and emotional features as well as bodily postures that
must all be taken into account during therapeutic treatment (e.g.,
Michalak et al., 2009). By considering human expression as com-
plex in nature, the NF therapist is able to ﬁnd the most appropriate
manner for interacting with the client. If one manner of expres-
sion is inappropriate, another manner may be pursued, and, as
suggested by Röhricht (2009) in referring to body-centered tech-
niques, unexpected results can be achieved. Let us consider, for
example, a person suffering ruminations. The patient may be very
careful and skilled at identifying appropriate verbal responses to
the therapist’s requests. In such cases the therapeutic process could
be made difﬁcult. A way to achieve treatment results in such cases
would be for the therapist to use the physical channel. The ther-
apist must thus work on the client’s body (Ottoboni and Iacono,
2013) with calm and wide hand-on massages. Indeed, the focus of
this therapeutic technique would be to calm the patient’s thoughts
and let the therapeutic process to begin.
The healing outcomes are achieved by helping the client to
re-experience the BEsS that were not positively experienced in
the past. The process is intensive because, by using a grounding
approach, the therapists tend to re-create the same physical and
emotional conditions the patient experienced when the trauma
begun. Mental thoughts, verbal expressions and body-related
experiences are used in a combined fashion. The clients could, for
example, be asked to lie down on the ground as they did in child-
hood, to wander in the room and express their feeling during the
walk, or to vocalize with pre-verbal utterances the psychophysical
sensations that therapeutic hand-on messages have made emerge.
To repeat, these techniques are mainly used to make the patients
emotionally regress to the speciﬁc moment of their past, because,
in this way, the client may discharge the old memories and form
new ones from the experience just-lived (Rispoli, 2008; Ottoboni
and Iacono, 2013).
The change in the patient that the NF therapist aims to achieve
concerns the attempt to reconstruct the harmonious organization
of the Self as it was in the womb. Even if such a concept could be
criticized for not accounting for the gestational period, the fetus
could potentially experience problems and disease, premonitory
of future functioning. I personally consider that the harmonious
state indicates a general and natural state toward which everybody
is inclined to experience. Using a Mindfulness concept, it could be
claimed that such a harmonious state is the state of acceptance of
internal and external changes (Grossman et al., 2004). This state
involves a calm and relaxed state of mind.
CONCLUSION
A growing number of studies have shown that human cognition,
emotions, and behaviors have embodied features, or as Barsalou
(2008) has preferred to describe, grounded features.
However, this knowledge still remains in the research domain
and is rarely applied in clinical practice. An attempt to translate
grounded evidence in clinical practice has been introduced in a
recent paper. Bedford (2012) theorizes that the visual compo-
nent of perception can cure a number of medical symptoms by
affecting the immune system. Vision, however, is controlled and
modulated (Rizzolatti et al., 1994) by the motor system, as in the
case of visual awareness studies demonstrating that the motor plan
moderates perceptions of plan-congruent objects (Symes et al.,
2008), or the reaching of a target in absence of visual awareness
(Binsted et al., 2007). Interestingly, the visual information con-
cerning the body is integrated and combined in several areas in
the brain with information coming from the other senses too (see
Blanke, 2012 for a review). As soon as the visually based infor-
mation, mainly deﬁning a map-like representation of body (e.g.,
Tessari et al., 2010), are integrated with kinesthetic and vestibular
information, a body-based sense of self takes place (Blanke and
Metzinger, 2009).
In sum, it appears that the approaches that effectively integrate
cognitive andmotor aspects of humanbehavior are few in number.
One such approach is the NF approach (Rispoli, 2008; Ottoboni
and Iacono, 2013). By working simultaneously on imagery-related
techniques, verbal and bodily techniques (such as hand-on mas-
sages or body movements), the NF approach accounts for all
aspects of human expression from a grounded perspective. During
treatment, past experiences, which generate actual psychologi-
cal states, are recalled and experienced again physically within a
clinical setting.
However, the grounded assumptions, as well as the grounded
techniques, must be tested thoroughly. As this review demon-
strates, embodied cognition and grounded clinical approaches are
still far from integrated with each other. Research exploring the
effects of grounded therapeutic approaches should be a priority
for scientists interested in understanding human behavior and its
therapeutic treatments.
Scientiﬁc evidence suggests that embodied cognition could be
very useful for achieving such an aim. Equally, studies dealing
with embodied cognition could take advantage of what is known
in clinical settings.
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